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Part XII of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and
the Duty to Mitigate Against Climate
Change: Making Out a Claim,
Causation, and Related Issues
Seokwoo Lee* and Lowell Bautista**
Within the current state of international jurisprudence, there is a growing
recognition of the importance of ocean environmental protection. One of the
most significant recent examples is the decision in the South China Sea
Arbitration, which recognized the obligation of States to protect and preserve
the marine environment in disputed territorial or maritime areas. Despite this
overall trend, however, serious gaps in State practice remain. In particular,
current research on State practice of national and regional marine pollution
contingency planning in the Asia-Pacific reveals that there has been little regard
displayed in the region for accommodating a proactive approach to marine
environmental protection.
The international community, particularly the States that are suffering the
consequences of climate change and sea-level rise, is attempting to tackle the
problem of climate change and to find ways to mitigate its damages. One
suggestion has been to bring a legal claim before an international tribunal to
commence climate change litigation. From the perspective of the current regime
of international law, including the Law of the Sea and State responsibility, the
feasibility and effectiveness of climate change litigation is highly questionable.
This is largely due to the challenges of establishing causation and other related
issues.
An alternative suggestion is to use the legal mechanism of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, not to adjudicate the issue, but to seek
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the issuance of an advisory opinion on the legal question presented by climate
change in light of international agreements related to the purposes of this
Convention. The problem with such an advisory opinion, however, would be its
potential for ineffectiveness due to its non-binding character.
In conclusion, there is no single solution to resolve the issue of climate
change. However, a better understanding of the linkages between Parties’
obligations under relevant treaties such as the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, among others, may provide an additional
impetus for States to take climate change seriously and increase efforts to
negotiate additional agreements and implement them effectively.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a problem that transcends State boundaries and one that
raises intergenerational concerns as well as contentious issues of equity between
developed and developing nations.1 The unique nature of climate change requires
that international efforts to address its impacts and challenges recognize the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities,2 and that they be mindful
of the social and economic goals of developing countries.3
Most contemporary international environmental treaties and the broader
international climate change legal framework have successfully managed to
incorporate progressive ideals that underscore interstate social and distributive
justice provisions.4 However, effective enforcement and compliance with

1. Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 498 (1993); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY 10–11 (1989); Upendra Baxi, Towards a Climate Change Justice Theory?, 7 J. HUM. RTS. &
ENV’T 7, 26 (2016) (arguing that the notion of intergenerational justice is crucial to the discourse on
climate justice theory); Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Consensus: Emerging International Law, 34
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 549–553 (2010) (recounting the disagreement between
African developing nations and developed nations during the Copenhagen negotiations).
2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., art. 3, ¶ 1, art. 4, adopted
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994). The concept
of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) was enshrined as Principle 7 of the Rio
Declaration at the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I),
annex I (Aug. 12 1992) (“In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States
have common but differentiated responsibilities.”); see also Paris Agreement art. 2, opened for signature
Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. 16-1104 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016) (stating that the Agreement “will be
implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”).
3. Brooke Ackerly & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change Justice: The Challenge for
Global Governance, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 553, 555 (2008); Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger,
Advancing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change for Sustainable Development, 5 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 202, 210, 222 (2016); Tuiloma Neroni Slade, Climate Change: The Human Rights
Implications for Small Island Developing States, 37 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 215, 216 (2007).
4. Mark Stallworthy, Environmental Justice Imperatives for an Era of Climate Change, 36 J.L. &
SOC’Y 55, 62 (2009); Lavanya Rajamani, The Increasing Currency and Relevance of Rights-Based
Perspectives in the International Negotiations on Climate Change, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 391, 395–97 (2010);
see also Jessie Hohmann, Igloo as Icon: A Human Rights Approach to Climate Change for the Inuit?, 18
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 295, 297‒98 (2009) (describing the use of human rights to address
climate change impacts); Sarah Krakoff, American Indians, Climate Change, and Ethics for a Warming
World, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 865, 891‒95 (2008) (noting the shift in addressing climate change to include
addressing poverty and inequality); Karen E. MacDonald, A Right to a Healthful Environment ‒ Humans
and Habitats: Re-Thinking Rights in an Age of Climate Change, 17 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 213,
214‒15, 223 (2008).

LEE AND BAUTISTA ELQ 45.1 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

132

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

9/9/18 9:12 AM

[Vol. 45:129

international environmental instruments remain difficult and politically complex
issues.5
The existing literature on climate change, justice, and all related treaties,
recognizes both the unequal contributions by States in causing climate change
and the disparate abilities of States to address it.6 Developing nations, especially
the least-developed countries and developing small-island nations, that
minimally contribute to the problem of climate change, are the most vulnerable
with the least capacity to adapt to climate change.7 The disparity between
developed and developing nations is a very divisive issue that further complicates
the already-complex international negotiations on climate change.
The international legal framework regarding States’ differing legal
responsibilities for climate change damage is still in its nascent stages of
development.8 In particular, the intersection of international environmental
instruments relating to climate change and the protection of the international
marine environment has not yet been fully explored.9 Despite the inadequacies
of existing international law, it is not hard to envision a future scenario where
interstate litigation involving transboundary damage caused by climate change
will be possible.10
This Article will examine Part XII of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which relates to the protection and preservation of

5. See Ailsa Ceri Warnock, The Climate Change Regime: Efficacy, Compliance and Enforcement,
8 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 104–16, 131–35 (2004) (discussing the efficacy of compliance mechanisms
contained within the UNFCC and the Kyoto Protocol).
6. See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, International Environmental Law Principles, and
the North-South Divide, 26 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 252 (2017).
7. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 11; Ved P. Nanda, Climate Change and Developing
Countries: The International Law Perspective, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539, 543 (2010).
8. See Benoit Mayer, State Responsibility and Climate Change Governance: A Light Through the
Storm, 13 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 539, 546 (2014) (noting that the concept of “common but differentiated
responsibilities” in protecting the climate system to this day remains ambiguous and has created
“fundamentally divergent conceptions of international co-operation on climate change”); Christina Voigt,
State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2008) (citing “[v]ague
primary rules” as one obstacle to determining State responsibility); see also Phillip Barton, State
Responsibility and Climate Change: Could Canada Be Liable to Small Island States?, 11 DALHOUSIE J.
LEGAL STUD. 65, 87 (2002) (arguing that the likelihood of success of a state liability claim based on harms
from climate change impacts would require a “tremendous leap” in international law).
9. Karen N. Scott, International Environmental Governance: Managing Fragmentation Through
Institutional Connection, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 177, 185 (2011); see also Secretariats of the Convention
on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Options for Enhanced Cooperation Among the Three Rio
Conventions, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2004/INF.19, annex (Nov. 2, 2004) (calling on each of the
Conferences of the Parties to the Rio Conventions to enhance collaboration among the conventions).
10. See, e.g., RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 43, 152‒53 (2005); Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs,
Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue the United States in the
International Court of Justice, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 103, 105 (2005); Jacqueline Peel, Issues in
Climate Change Litigation, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 15, 15 (2011).
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the marine environment and the duty to mitigate against climate change under
international law. It will also consider recent jurisprudence, specifically the
South China Sea Arbitration, which discussed the protection of the marine
environment in disputed maritime space. The Article concludes that there is no
single solution to resolve the issue of climate change, but a better understanding
of the interconnected nature of the obligations of State parties under relevant
treaties may provide further impetus for States to take climate change seriously
and increase their efforts to negotiate and effectively implement additional
agreements. The purpose of this Article is to contribute to the discussion of
challenges associated with international litigation involving liability for climate
change damages. It will proceed in four parts.
Part I will discuss the South China Sea Arbitration and the protection of the
marine environment while examining the implications of the award, which
obligates States to protect the marine environment in disputed territorial and
maritime space. Part II will be an analysis of marine contingency planning in the
Asia-Pacific region in the context of the obligation of States to deal with the
harmful effects of marine pollution within the UNCLOS framework. Part III will
explore the challenges associated with litigation involving climate change
damages. Part IV will outline the implications of the request for an advisory
opinion before the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea.
I. SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION AND THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT: EVOLUTION OF UNCLOS PART XII THROUGH
INTERPRETATION AND THE DUTY TO COOPERATE
A. UNCLOS Part XII and the Protection of the Marine Environment
The protection and preservation of the marine environment constitute a
prominent component of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).11 Part XII of UNCLOS is the cornerstone of international
environmental law of the sea and embodies a balance of competing social,
economic, and environmental interests in the marine environment.12 On the
surface, UNCLOS provisions in Part XII appear to be sufficiently broad to permit
States to pursue a claim against another State for failure to mitigate
11. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 192‒237, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994); see also David
M. Dzidzornu, Four Principles in Marine Environment Protection: A Comparative Analysis, 29 OCEAN
DEV. & INT’L L. 91, 91 (1998); Eric Franckx, Regional Marine Environment Protection Regimes in the
Context of UNCLOS, 13 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 307, 310‒11 (1998); Moira L. McConnell &
Edgar Gold, The Modern Law of the Sea: Framework for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment?, 23 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 85 (1991) (acknowledging that the marine
environmental provisions of UNCLOS contain the highest-level global directives for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment presently available) .
12. Jonathan I. Charney, The Protection of the Marine Environment by the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 731, 732 (1995).
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environmental problems caused by climate change, as failing to do so would
seem to fall short of States’ obligations to preserve and protect the marine
environment.13 Under Article 194, States are obligated to preserve and protect
the marine environment through preventing, controlling, and reducing
pollution.14 States are also obligated to use the best practical means in
accordance with a State’s capabilities to prevent pollution from spreading outside
a State’s jurisdiction.15 These provisions of UNCLOS are relevant in establishing
a potential claim against a State for failing to mitigate climate change with regard
to the handling of its marine environment.16
Regarding Part XII provisions of UNCLOS, it is conceivable that
international tribunals will be able to make some connection to other
international agreements. UNCLOS provides that an international court or
tribunal with UNCLOS jurisdiction shall apply UNCLOS along with other rules
of international law that are not incompatible with UNCLOS.17 This approach is
consistent with the rules of treaty interpretation.18
In particular, for member States of UNCLOS that are also State parties to
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the CBD may provide a new
context for understanding the international legal implications for marine
pollution and the efforts required to meet the obligations under UNCLOS to
protect and preserve the marine environment.19 Because of the widespread
acceptance of both conventions, the influence of the CBD on the interpretation
of the marine environment provisions of UNCLOS may turn out to be substantial.
It may be that to properly understand the State parties’ obligations under
UNCLOS in Part XII, they should be examined in light of the general recognition
that climate change is a significant threat to biological diversity.20 Moreover,

13. Keely Boom, Exposure to Legal Risk for Climate Change Damage Under the UNFCCC, Kyoto
Protocol and LOSC: A Case Study of Tuvalu and Australia 182‒92 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Wollongong), http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4926&context =theses.
14. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 194, ¶ 1.
15. Id. at art. 194, ¶ 2.
16. The substantive provisions of Part XII of UNCLOS which are possible sources of legal
exposure are Articles 192, 194, and 195.
17. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 293.
18. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (providing that any relevant rules of
international law and supplementary means of interpretation may be consulted when interpreting a treaty).
19. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 22, ¶ 2, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (“Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention
with respect to the marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under the law
of the sea.”).
20. See, e.g., Elisa Morgera, Far Away, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions
Between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law, 2 CLIMATE L. 85, 113–15
(2011) (discussing the increasing understanding of the links between global biodiversity loss and climate
change, as well as the possible legal bases to support synergies between biodiversity law and climate
change law); see also Michael Bowman, Conserving Biological Diversity in an Era of Climate Change:
Local Implementation of International Wildlife Treaties, 53 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 289, 291–92 (2010)
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some legal recognition that biological diversity is crucial to good ecosystem
health may be required.
Given the link between climate change and the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment under UNCLOS, the CBD is likely to play a
significant role in interpreting the obligations of State parties to lessen the impact
of climate change. Article 293 of UNCLOS invites the use of the CBD as an
interpretative tool to the extent that it is not incompatible with UNCLOS.21 The
application of the CBD as an interpretive tool would be limited to disputes
involving Parties bound by both treaties.22
The relative impacts of such an important connection between UNCLOS
and the CBD are all the more relevant due to the result of the South China Sea
Arbitration, as discussed in Section B. The implications of the South China Sea
Arbitration on the protection of the marine environment and efforts to mitigate
the impact of climate change are potentially twofold. First, the Award provides
a precedent in which Part XII of UNCLOS can be linked to other environmental
treaty regimes through interpretation. Second, the Award partially illustrates how
the duty to cooperate emerges and operates in relation to other duties that fall
under Part XII of UNCLOS. In other words, the Award establishes how the
obligations found in Part XII can evolve through the duty to cooperate.
B. The South China Sea Arbitration and the Protection of the Marine
Environment
On July 12, 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of
UNCLOS issued its final award in a dispute between the Philippines and China
over maritime claims in the South China Sea.23 The ruling is groundbreaking for
several reasons, principally the innovative interpretation and application of
Articles 192 and 194 of UNCLOS imposing obligations on States to protect and
preserve the marine environment in disputed territorial or maritime areas.24
(noting the growing body of scholarship on issues arising out of the relationship between biodiversity and
climate change).
21. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 293 (stating that the applicable law that a court or tribunal with
jurisdiction shall apply will be the UNCLOS “and other rules of international law not incompatible with
this Convention”).
22. See Rüdiger Wolfrum & Nele Matz, Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 4 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 445, 473–
74 (2000); see also In re South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case Repository No. 201319, Award of July 12, 2016, ¶¶ 159, 908 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) [hereinafter The South China Sea
Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016].
23. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22; see also Bernard H.
Oxman, The South China Sea Arbitration Award, 24 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 237 (2017)
(recounting the details of the arbitral award).
24. The Tribunal in its Award on Jurisdiction ruled that it has jurisdiction over the Philippines and
the claim that “China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine
environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef,
Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef.” The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016,
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The Philippines asserted that China’s tolerance of harmful fishing practices
and harmful construction activities caused serious harm to the marine
environment of the South China Sea.25 The Tribunal, on the basis of expert
reports,26 ruled that “China’s artificial island-building activities on the seven
reefs in the Spratly Islands have caused devastating and long-lasting damage to
the marine environment.”27 The Tribunal held that China’s activities breached
its obligation under Article 192 and Article 194(1), and that China “violated its
duty under Article 194(5) to take measures necessary to protect and preserve rare
or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered
species and other forms of marine life.”28 The Tribunal also concluded that
“China has, through its toleration and protection of, and failure to prevent
Chinese fishing vessels engaging in harmful harvesting activities of endangered
species . . . breached Articles 192 and 194(5) of the Convention.”29
The Tribunal placed primacy on the obligation of States to protect the
marine environment even over disputed territorial and maritime areas by setting
aside the question of sovereignty over the contested features.30 In the words of
the Tribunal:
[T]he obligations in Part XII apply to all States with respect to the marine
environment in all maritime areas, both inside the national jurisdiction of
States and beyond it. Accordingly, questions of sovereignty are irrelevant to
the application of Part XII of the Convention. The Tribunal’s findings in this

supra note 22, ¶¶ 112, 906‒11, 925‒38 (specifically, in connection with the marine environment, the
Philippines asserted that China breached Articles 123, 192, 194, 197, 205, and 206 of UNCLOS); see also
In re South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case Repository No. 2013-19, Award on
Jurisdiction & Admissibility, ¶¶ 101, 281, 408, 409, 413(G) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter The South
China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015].
25. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶¶ 817, 894–905, 966,
983.
26. See id. ¶ 821. The Tribunal appointed Dr. Sebastian C.A. Ferse of the Leibniz Center for
Tropical Marine Ecology in Bremen, Germany to seek his independent opinion on the environmental
impact of China’s construction activities. Id. The Tribunal also appointed Dr. Peter J. Mumby, a professor
of coral reef ecology, and Dr. Selina Ward, both from the School of Biological Sciences at the University
of Queensland, Australia, who provided their “Assessment of the Potential Environmental Consequences
of Construction Activities on Seven Reefs in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.” Id.
27. Id. ¶ 983.
28. Id. Further, in the words of the Tribunal: “The Tribunal further finds that China has, through
its island-building activities at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef,
Hughes Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef, breached Articles 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, 123, and 206 of
the Convention.” Id. ¶ 993.
29. Id. ¶ 992 (specifically referring to activities at “Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal and
other features in the Spratly Islands.”).
30. In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal held that the Philippines’ submission (Submission
No. 11) “reflects a dispute concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment at
relevant features within the South China Sea and the application of Articles 192 and 194 of the
Convention” and “not a dispute concerning sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it barred
from the Tribunal’s consideration by any requirement of Section 1 of Part XV.” Id. ¶ 926; The South
China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015, supra note 24, ¶ 408.
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Chapter have no bearing upon, and are not in any way dependent upon, which
State is sovereign over features in the South China Sea.31

The Tribunal ruled that China’s activities in the disputed areas and the
effects of those activities on the marine environment did not concern sovereignty
or maritime boundary delimitation.32 The Award noted that the environmental
obligations in Part XII of UNCLOS “apply to States irrespective of where the
alleged harmful activities took place.”33 It also noted that these obligations are
independent from questions of sovereignty over any particular feature, from a
prior determination of the status of any maritime feature, and from the prior
delimitation of any overlapping entitlements.34
C. An Expansive Interpretation of Part XII
The Tribunal sustained an expansive interpretive approach to Part XII of
UNCLOS. In the Award, the Tribunal noted that while Article 192 of UNCLOS,
which imposes upon State parties the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment, is phrased in general terms, the content of this duty “is
informed by the other provisions of Part XII and other applicable rules of
international law”35 as well as by “specific obligations set out in other
international agreements, as envisaged in Article 237 of the Convention.”36 In so
doing, the Tribunal, by referring to the interface of the provisions of Part XII of
UNCLOS and other relevant provisions contained in the “corpus of international
law relating to the environment,”37 submits a very high standard of due diligence
amongst State parties in relation to the scope of the obligations contained in Part
XII of UNCLOS.38
Generally, State parties have the obligation to protect the marine
environment from future damage and to preserve the same by maintaining or
improving its present condition.39 More specifically, the Tribunal interpreted
Articles 192 and 194 of UNCLOS as setting forth obligations that apply not only
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 940.
Id. ¶ 932; The South China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015, supra note 24, ¶ 409.
The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 927.
Id.; The South China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015, supra note 24, ¶ 408.
The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 941.
Id. ¶ 942.
Id. ¶ 941.
The Tribunal in its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility acknowledged that “some overlap
in the subject matter of Part XII of the Convention and the subject matter of the CBD” exists. The South
China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015, supra note 24, ¶ 284. Further, “[t]he two treaties establish
parallel environmental regimes that overlap” where “[o]ne creates a distinct jurisdiction to address the
protection of the marine environment whilst the other aims to protect biodiversity in general.” Id. ¶ 285.
However, the Tribunal clarified that whilst the “same facts may give rise to violations of both treaties,” it
still agreed with the argument of the Philippines that a “dispute under UNCLOS does not become a dispute
under the CBD merely because there is some overlap between the two. Parallel regimes remain parallel
regimes.” Id.
39. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 941.
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to activities directly undertaken by States, but also to ensure activities “within
their jurisdiction and control do not harm the marine environment.”40 The
Tribunal clarified that Article 192 carries the dual obligation “to take active
measures to protect and preserve the marine environment, and by logical
implication, entails the negative obligation not to degrade the marine
environment.”41 Furthermore, the general obligations in Article 192 require
States to “ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control.”42 In the context
of the South China Sea and in relation to the complained of activities by China,
this includes the positive duty of States “to prevent, or at least mitigate significant
harm to the environment when pursuing large-scale construction activities.”43
The first implication of this expansive interpretation is that it provides a
precedent linking Part XII of UNCLOS to other environmental treaty regimes.
The unique character of UNCLOS as a “Constitution of the Oceans” allows it to
be flexible and responsive enough to deal with emerging problems as a living
instrument.44 There are potentially a number of conventions that could be taken
into account to clarify the numerous generic terms that are found in UNCLOS
that are not specifically defined.45 Further, even when UNCLOS does provide a

40. Id. ¶¶ 944, 945. The Tribunal draws this interpretation from the Fisheries Advisory Opinion of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the decision of International Court of Justice in Pulp
Mills on the River Uruguay, the Seabed Disputes Chamber advisory opinion, and the Chagos Marine
Protected Area arbitration. See id.; see also Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the SubRegional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015, 15 ITLOS Rep.
4, 36–42 ¶¶ 118‒36; Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), Case Nos. 3 & 4,
Requests for Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 280, 295, ¶ 70, [hereinafter
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, 79–80, ¶ 197 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Pulp Mills Case]; Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities With Respect to Activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion
submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), Case. No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS
Rep. 10, 41–42, ¶¶ 112, 113; In re Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA
Case Repository No. 2011-03, Award of Mar. 18, 2015, ¶¶ 320–538 (Per. Ct. Arb. 2015).
41. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 941.
42. Id.
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. However, the effect on Statehood of climate change and sea level rise is an example of a
problem that UNCLOS does not directly address. See, e.g., Michael Gagain, Climate Change, Sea Level
Rise, and Artificial Islands: Saving the Maldives’ Statehood and Maritime Claims Through the
‘Constitution of the Oceans,’ 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77, 82 (2012).
45. For instance, in addition to UNCLOS, there are other international treaties of global application
that also cover the protection of the marine environment from pollution caused by the dumping of waste
and other matter into the ocean. See, e.g., 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1 (1997)
[hereinafter 1996 Protocol to the London Convention of 1972] (entered into force Mar. 24, 2006);
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources art. 1, opened for signature
June 4, 1974, 1546 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (entered into force May 6, 1978);
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter art. 1, opened
for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403 [hereinafter London Convention] (entered into force Aug.
30, 1975).
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definition, as it does in the case of the term “pollution of the marine
environment,” a term’s meaning will need to be updated as time passes to address
new challenges.46 For instance, the argument has been made that the protection
of the marine environment from global climate change cannot be resolved
without interpreting the UNCLOS provisions in light of the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,47 and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)48 and its associated
international agreements.49
The question then arises as to whether the South China Sea Arbitration
demonstrates a way for Article 192 of UNCLOS to become a tool to deal with
significant threats to the marine environment. The Tribunal’s decision clearly
provides that the provisions of Part XII and other applicable rules of international
law inform the content of Article 192.50 The Tribunal found that the duty to
prevent the harvest of endangered species based on Article 192—which applies
in the context of fragile ecosystems by virtue of Article 194(5)—and must be
“read against the background of other applicable international law.”51 In the
Award, a due diligence obligation to prevent the harvesting of endangered
species, including giant clams and sea turtles, was deduced from Articles 192
and 194(5) in the light of the CBD52 and the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).53

46. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 1, ¶ 1, § 4; see, e.g., Erik Franckx, Coastal State Jurisdiction
with Respect to Marine Pollution—Some Recent Developments and Future Challenges, 10 INT’L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 253, 256–57 (1995) (arguing that the status quo on the protection and preservation
of the marine environment as written down in the 1982 Convention is currently under pressure); Kristina
M. Gjerde, Challenges to Protecting the Marine Environment Beyond National Jurisdiction, 27 INT’L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 839, 846–47 (2012) (arguing for the possibility of building and modernizing the
relevant framework and noting that the Convention paved the way for the continuous upgrade of
international rules and standards); Antonio J. Rodriguez et al., Evolution of Marine Pollution Law, 1966–
2016, 91 TUL. L. REV. 1009, 1024, 1043 (2017) (discussing how major oil spills and releases of hazardous
substances have pushed marine pollution law since 1966 to increase dramatically the scope of regulation,
liability of polluters, and mechanisms to ensure funding for cleaning up spills and compensation for
damages).
47. Alan Boyle, Law of the Sea Perspectives on Climate Change, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 831, 834 -836 (2012). See also Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
14‒16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
48. UNFCCC, supra note 2.
49. There are other international instruments on the protection of the atmosphere. See, e.g., Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 2303
U.N.T.S. 162, (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988).
50. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶¶ 941‒49.
51. Id. ¶ 959.
52. Id. ¶ 945; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 19.
53. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 956; Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973,
27 U.S.T. 1087 (entered into force July 1, 1975).
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However, in addition to this, the Tribunal expounded that the due diligence
obligation imposed under Article 192 encompasses not just the obligation “to
take those measures ‘necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems
as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other
forms of marine life,’” but also “extends to the prevention of harms that would
affect depleted, threatened, or endangered species indirectly through the
destruction of their habitat.”54 Undoubtedly, Article 192 is now a framework
provision that requires a living interpretation in the light of the developments in
international law.
The second implication of the expansive interpretation concerns the
evolving nature of UNCLOS Part XII with respect to the legal principle of the
duty to cooperate.55 The importance of the duty to cooperate has been recognized
especially in the field of international environmental law, where rules and
principles continue to develop and where compliance with these rules and
principles are brought about by cooperation rather than the imposition of legal
liability and fault.56 International tribunals, including, most notably, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Tribunal for the Law of

54. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 959 (quoting
UNCLOS Article 192). In this regard, the Tribunal considers the harvesting of sea turtles, species
threatened with extinction, and the harvesting of corals and giant clams from the waters surrounding
Scarborough Shoal and features in the Spratly Islands to constitute a harm to the marine environment. Id.
¶ 960. Therefore, in the view of the Tribunal, “a failure to take measures to prevent these practices would
constitute a breach of Articles 192 and 194(5) of the Convention.” Id.
55. UNCLOS contains various provisions that impose the duty to cooperate on States
parties. These include, Articles 41, 43, 61(2), 64(1), 65, 66, 69(4), 70(4), 94(7), 98 (2), 100, 108
(1), 109(1), 117, 118, 123, 129, 130, 144(2), 151(1)(a), 197, 199, 200, 201, 226(2), 235(3), 243,
266(1), 273, 276(2), and 303. The duty to cooperate is specifically mentioned in several provisions
Of Part XII of UNCLOS. These include Article 197, which provides that:
States shall co-operate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention,
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features.
The duty to cooperate is also found in Article 199, on contingency plans against pollution; in Article
200 on studies, research programmes and exchange of information and data acquired about pollution
of the marine environment; in Article 201, in establishing appropriate scientific criteria for the
formulation and elaboration of rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures for the
prevention, reduction, and control of pollution of the marine environment; in Article 226(2), which
enjoins State to cooperate to develop procedures for the avoidance of unnecessary physical
inspection of vessels at sea; and in Article 235(3), which imposes on States the duty to cooperate on
international law relating to “responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for
damage and the settlement of related disputes” and the “development of criteria and procedures for
payment of adequate compensation.”
56. See, e.g., Margaret A. Young & Sebastián Rioseco Sullivan, Evolution Through the Duty to
Cooperate: Implications of the Whaling Case at the International Court of Justice, 16 MELB. J. INT’L L.
311, 328‒38 (2015) (discussing the duty to cooperate in the context of the whaling regime).
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the Sea (ITLOS), have on occasion expounded on the duty to cooperate.57 The
Arbitral Tribunal’s emphasis on the importance of cooperation, coordination,
and communication appears to endorse the existence of the duty to cooperate as
a fundamental principle of Part XII as well as a principle under general
international law.58 Given this, the scope of application appears to be wider than
the explicit formulation of the duty to cooperate under Articles 123 and 197 of
UNCLOS.
II. CAN STATES MOVE FROM DISASTER RELIEF TO DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION?: IMPROVING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL MARINE POLLUTION
CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
A. The Obligation to Engage in Marine Contingency Planning
In considering whether a case could be made for using Part XII of UNCLOS
to establish liability for the impact of climate change on the marine environment,
it should be noted that States already have a perceived obligation to take
proactive measures to deal with the harmful effects of marine pollution in
contrast to a reactive approach.59
Within the UNCLOS framework, States agreed in Article 198 and Article
199 to “immediately notify other States” and “competent international
organizations” likely to be affected by a pollution incident and to “jointly
develop and promote contingency plans” so that States can best coordinate their
efforts “to the extent possible, in eliminating the effects of pollution and
preventing or minimizing the damage.”60 When read together, Article 198 and
Article 199 appear to establish a positive obligation for State parties to engage in
marine contingency planning. Marine pollution contingency plans respond to
marine pollution disasters and emergencies in order to protect marine
resources.61 In light of existing State practices of marine contingency planning
and opinio juris, these UNCLOS provisions also appear to codify an established
customary international rule.62

57. The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, 5 ITLOS Rep. 95, 110
¶ 82 [hereinafter The MOX Plant Case]; Land Reclamation in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v.
Sing.), Case No. 12, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, 7 ITLOS Rep. 10, 25 ¶ 92 [hereinafter Straits of Johor Case];
Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), supra
note 40, at 43, ¶ 140; Pulp Mills Case, supra note 40, at 49, ¶ 77.
58. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶¶ 946, 985.
59. Id. ¶ 941.
60. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at arts. 198, 199.
61. ANASTASIA TELESETSKY ET AL., MARINE POLLUTION CONTINGENCY PLANNING: STATE
PRACTICE IN ASIA-PACIFIC STATES 3 (2017).
62. See, e.g., Constantinos Triantafillou et al., Contingency Planning in the European Union: The
Importance of Cooperation Between States, 21 OCEAN Y.B. 427, 431–35 (2007) (outlining the pollution
response frameworks at the national, regional, European, and international levels pertaining to major
marine pollution incidents within European waters); see also Tony George Puthucherril, Adapting to
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States are accorded a great deal of latitude in deciding what might trigger
the operation of a contingency plan to protect marine resources. While Article
198 clearly establishes the principle of prevention by calling upon States to report
not just actual damage but also situations that pose “imminent danger,” the
Article does not provide for a specific standard as to the degree of damage
incurred that requires notification. Once notification under Article 198 is given,
States are expected, however, to proceed under the contingency plans developed
under Article 199 with assistance from competent international organizations.63
It is apparent than an implicit “due diligence” requirement on the part of all
UNCLOS State parties is embedded in Article 198. The phrase “becomes aware”
suggests that a State must take the initiative to patrol within its own borders and
maritime zones to identify incidents of potential pollution damage.64 Whether a
State will ultimately provide notification to other States after an inspection of its
waters within its jurisdiction will depend upon how comprehensively the State
defines “pollution.”65 Under the UNCLOS definition of pollution, a broad range
of events might require notification under Article 198.66
The emphasis in Article 199 on the establishment of contingency plans
originated from the treaty drafters’ view that there should be facilitation of
technical assistance for developing States coping with marine pollution
damage.67 However, it is not obvious from a plain reading of the text of
UNCLOS that the idea of extending technical assistance to developing States for

Climate Change and Accelerated Sea-Level Rise Through Integrated Coastal Zone Management Laws: A
Study of the South Asian Experience, 26 OCEAN Y.B. 533, 544–82 (2012) (examining the coastal zone
management legal regimes in the South Asian littoral countries and how they further the concept of
integrated coastal zone management and facilitate adaptation to climate change).
63. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at arts. 198, 199; see, e.g., International Convention on Oil Pollution,
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation art. 5, ¶¶ 2, 3, adopted Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 78 (entered
into force May 13, 1995) (encouraging States to inform the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
of severe oil pollution incidents).
64. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 198.
65. For example, member States of the IMO negotiated the 2000 Protocol on Preparedness,
Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, which was
adopted on March 15, 2000, and entered into force on June 14, 2007. This provides a global framework
for international co-operation in combating major incidents or threats of marine pollution. Protocol on
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances,
adopted Mar. 15, 2000, [2007] A.T.S. 47 (Austl.). Article 2, paragraph 2 defines “[h]azardous and noxious
substances” as “any substance other than oil which, if introduced into the marine environment is likely to
create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.” Id. at art. 2, ¶ 2.
66. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 1, ¶ 1 (defining “pollution of the marine environment” as “the
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including
estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and
marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities”).
67. MYRON NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A
COMMENTARY, VOLUME IV 88 (1990).
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marine contingency planning is present in the Convention.68 The only textual
reference to the differing capacity of developing States is the first sentence of
Article 199, which provides that “States in the area affected, in accordance with
their capabilities, and the competent international organizations shall co-operate,
to the extent possible” in handling a pollution incident.69 In contrast, the
remaining obligation in Article 199, to “jointly develop and promote contingency
plans for responding to pollution incidents in the marine environment,” is
applicable to all States.70
B. State Practice in Marine Contingency Planning in the Asia-Pacific Region
Analysis of State practices in marine contingency planning in the AsiaPacific region leads to two principal observations. First, States in the region
generally devised or substantially amended their national marine contingency
plans in response to catastrophic oil spills within their own waters.71 This
suggests that the evolution of national marine contingency planning tended to be
more individually reactive. Even when catastrophic events occur, such as the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, States that are not the locus of the accident tend not
to view such external disasters as an opportunity to reflect critically on their own
operational preparedness.72
Second, Asia-Pacific States vary in terms of the availability of public and
private resources available to respond to marine pollution incidents.73 It is
apparent creating an emergency response communication network that can

68. However, UNCLOS in its text refers to the preferential treatment given to, as well as the
obligation to provide scientific and technical assistance to developing States. See UNCLOS, supra note
11, at arts. 202, 203, 266, 269, 274.
69. Id. at art. 199.
70. Id.; NORDQUIST, supra note 67, at 87.
71. For example, in the case of the Philippines, Oil Pollution Compensation Act of 2007, Republic
Act No. 9483, 2 June 2007, was enacted in the aftermath of the M/T Solar 1 incident. In the case of
Australia, the catalyst for the inception of the National Contingency Plan was the 1970 Oceanic Grandeur
incident. In 1997, Japan after the Nakhodka oil spill revealed that its oil spill preparedness and response
regime were insufficient to address large-scale marine pollution incidents.
72. There are ample academic literature on lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon incident,
see for example, Martin Davies, Liability Issues Raised by the Deepwater Horizon Blowout, 25 AUSTL. &
N.Z. MAR. L.J. 35 (2011), and Vincent J. Foley, Deepwater Horizon: The Legal Fallout—The Framework
for Liability, Fines, and Penalties for Oil Pollution, 22 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 280 (2010), and Vincent J.
Foley, Post-Deepwater Horizon: The Changing Landscape of Liability for Oil Pollution in the United
States, 74 ALB. L. REV. 515 (2010), and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Sad Tale of the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster, Normal Accidents, and Our Appetite for Risk, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 264 (2012), and
Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 1077 (2011).
73. See Ma. Gregoria Joanne P. Tiquio et al., Management Frameworks for Coastal and Marine
Pollution in the European and South East Asian Regions, 135 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 65, 72–73
(2017).
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effectively link local, regional, and national entities capable of providing
practical responses to marine pollution incidents is a recurring challenge.74
Given the shift away from a reactive approach to marine pollution, the need
has emerged for a systemic change in which States regard contingency planning
as part of a proactive and adaptive management process. This requires that States
actively seek, as part of an iterative learning process, to design responses to new
types of marine oil pollution scenarios. For example, States should consider the
unique emergency scenarios that may arise with the operation of new classes of
transport vessels, such as ultra-large crude carriers. States should also examine
the impact climate change might have on oil pollution responses. For example,
States should examine if changes in ocean currents will impact existing oil spill
dispersion models or if there should be changes to the location, access to, and
deployment of response equipment storage. Ultimately, despite limited resources
and capacity, States in the Asia-Pacific should maintain comprehensive,
integrated, and robust national contingency planning responses based on sound
domestic legal and policy structures in order to protect and preserve ocean and
coastal resources.
III. PART XII AND THE DUTY TO MITIGATE AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE:
MAKING OUT A CLAIM, CAUSATION, AND RELATED ISSUES
UNCLOS is the key international legal instrument, outside of the climate
change regime, which could be a potential source of international litigation on
climate change. However, there are a number of issues that may arise in such
litigation, including choice of the most effective international forum, the
difficulty of establishing jurisdiction, attribution, causation, and apportionment
of liability and responsibility.75
The UNFCCC in its preamble recognizes that
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.76

74. See, e.g., Suk Kyoon Kim, Marine Pollution Response in Northeast Asia and the NOWPAP
Regime, 46 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 17, 30 (2015) (arguing for closer cooperation within the region with
respect to marine pollution preparedness and response); Jae-Hyup Lee, Transboundary Pollution in
Northeast Asia: An International Environmental Law Perspective, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 769, 775–77
(2013); Craig Forrest, State Cooperation in Combating Transboundary Marine Pollution in South East
Asia, 30 AUSTL. & N.Z. MAR. L.J. 78 (2016) (considering the degree to which a collaborative international
legal framework exists in Southeast Asia for pollution arising from shipping and offshore oil and gas
activities).
75. Boom, supra note 13, at 229.
76. UNFCCC, supra note 2, at pmbl.
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However, the text of the UNFCCC does not contain provisions that define
damages caused by climate change or provisions that address the issue of
compensation for damages from climate change.77 In view of this, there are some
State parties to the UNFCCC which have expressed reservations that their
ratification of the Convention does not constitute a renunciation of their rights
under international law concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of
climate change and that no provisions in the Convention can be interpreted as
derogating from the principles of general international law.78
The dispute settlement mechanism provided under the legal framework of
UNCLOS establishes a compulsory and binding framework for the peaceful
settlement of all ocean-related disputes.79 In Part XV of UNCLOS, State parties
have the duty to settle any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
the Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2(3) of the Charter
of the United Nations80 and to seek a solution using any of the means indicated
in Article 33(1) of the Charter.81 The unique nature of compulsory jurisdiction
under UNCLOS creates an attractive feature for claimant States for climate
change damage.82
A. Climate Change and UNCLOS
Climate change is an issue that was not yet in the global environmental
agenda during the time UNCLOS was negotiated.83 It is thus not a surprise that
the text and travaux preparatoire of UNCLOS do not contain any direct
references to climate change.84 However, whilst UNCLOS was not negotiated
and drafted to address issues related to climate change, there are provisions in
Part XII on the marine environment that could theoretically apply to climate

77.
78.

Voigt, supra note 8, at 4.
The Governments of Nauru, Tuvalu, Fiji, Kiribati, and Papua New Guinea submitted
declarations that the provisions of the UNFCCC “shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights
under international law concerning state responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change” or a
derogation of “principles of general international law.” UNFCCC, supra note 2 (Declarations by Parties).
79. Rosemary Rayfuse, The Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement Under the Law of the Sea
Convention, 30 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 683, 684‒85 (2005); see also Anne Sheehan, Dispute
Settlement Under UNCLOS: The Exclusion of Maritime Delimitation Disputes, 24 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 165,
165 (2005).
80. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3 (“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”).
81. The UN Charter lists the following means of peaceful settlement, which should be used by
member states in settling their disputes: “[N]egotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice.” Id. at art. 33.
82. Boom, supra note 13, at 198.
83. Alan Boyle, Law of the Sea Perspectives on Climate Change, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 831, 834–36 (2012).
84. See Meinhard Doelle, Climate Change and the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the
Law of the Sea Convention, 37 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 319, 321 (2006).
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change, greenhouse emissions, ocean acidification, and even the responsibility
of States to not cause transboundary climate change.85 Such provisions could
also bring accompanying liability for such damages under international law.86
UNCLOS provides for a general obligation on all State parties to “take all
measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are
so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their
jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise
sovereign rights.”87 UNCLOS Article 195 provides that States, in undertaking
measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment,
have the obligation “not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards
from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into another.”88 This
is a reflection of the “no harm rule,” which prohibits transboundary
environmental damage.89 This could be applied in the context of transboundary
harm caused by climate change: for instance, when greenhouse gas emissions
from one State cause damage to the marine environment of another State.90
Article 207 of UNCLOS requires States to “adopt laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based
sources . . . taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures.”91 Article 212 of UNCLOS covers
marine pollution from and through the atmosphere, which requires States to
“adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control” such pollution,
“taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures and the safety of air navigation.”92 It could be argued
that a State party could rely on Article 212 to apply UNCLOS to the damage
caused by climate change through the breach of another State party that has failed

85.
86.

Boyle, supra note 83, at 834–36.
See, e.g., id. at 834–35 (discussing potential liability under UNCLOS and the
Kyoto Protocol).
87. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 194, ¶ 2.
88. Id. at art. 195.
89. For further discussion of the no harm rule, see Benoît Mayer, The Relevance of the No-Harm
Principle to Climate Change Law and Politics, 19 ASIA PAC. J. ENVT’L L. 79, 79 (2016), and Kerryn
Brent et al., Does the ‘No-Harm’ Rule Have a Role in Preventing Transboundary Harm and Harm to the
Global Atmospheric Commons from Geoengineering?, 5 CLIMATE L. 35, 37 (2015).
90. Boom, supra note 13, at 191. Boom also argues that “a claimant State could rely upon Article
195 in relation to the process of ocean acidification,” since “it could be argued that the uptake of additional
CO2 as a mitigation action in order to reduce atmospheric concentrations would equate to the
transformation of one type of pollution into another.” Id.
91. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 207, ¶ 1.
92. Id. at art. 212, ¶ 1.

LEE AND BAUTISTA ELQ 45.1 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

9/9/18 9:12 AM

MAKING OUT A CLIMATE CHANGE CLAIM

147

to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from
atmospheric sources.93
Article 235 of UNCLOS provides that “States are responsible for the
fulfillment of their international obligations concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment.”94 The same Article does not
specifically mention State responsibility but provides that States “shall be liable
in accordance with international law.”95 Furthermore, Article 235, paragraph 3
of UNCLOS provides a possible connection between UNCLOS and the
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, and other climate-related
international instruments.96 UNCLOS should be read, interpreted, and applied
alongside marine pollution agreements.97
B. Challenges of Jurisdiction, Causation, and Related Issues
Assuming that the legal obligation for States to protect and preserve the
marine environment derived from UNCLOS is extended to also require State
parties to mitigate the effects of climate change, it will bring up the thorny issue
of causation.98 The main challenge for any claim made against a State would be
the ability of the claimant to establish a causal link between the failure of a
particular State to fulfill its obligation on the one hand and the harmful effect of
climate change on the marine environment on the other.99
The argument certainly could be made that a failure to mitigate the effects
of climate change would result in marine environment pollution as defined by
UNCLOS.100 Thus, a failure to prevent pollution could be considered a violation
of the parties’ UNCLOS obligations “to protect and preserve the marine
93. See William C. G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages in
International Fora: The Law of the Sea Convention, 2 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y
27, 46‒47 (2006).
94. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 235, ¶ 1.
95. Id.; see also Boyle, supra note 83, at 834–36 (discussing State liability under the Kyoto Protocol
and UNCLOS).
96. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 235, ¶ 3 (“States shall co-operate in the implementation of
existing international law and the further development of international law . . . .”).
97. See, e.g., 1996 Protocol to the London Convention of 1972, supra note 45; Paris Convention,
supra note 45; London Convention, supra note 45; Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, adopted Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 7,
1974).
98. Doelle, supra note 84, at 324‒25.
99. See Eric Biber, Climate Change, Causation, and Delayed Harm, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 975, 976
(2008) (noting that causation is difficult in this context because the effects of climate change are delayed);
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Responsibility and Climate Change, 53 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 122 (2010);
David A Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22‒27 (2003); cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Comparative Climate Change Torts, 46
VAL. U. L. REV. 1053, 1060–73 (2012) (noting that the causation requirement creates a significant hurdle
in establishing liability for climate change under Australian law, Chinese law, Israeli law, and South
African law).
100. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 1, ¶ 1, § 4; Boom, supra note 13, at 182‒84.
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environment.”101 However, the extent to which the contribution to climate
change by a particular State party or a number of State parties can be isolated as
to establish sufficient legal cause for liability would be very difficult to
determine. Problems would arise, such as how to determine the relative level of
contribution of a particular State in comparison to other countries, the capacity
of the State to reduce pollution, and the effect of the historical contribution to
overall pollution levels. This would create significant challenges in determining
whether a party failed to take sufficient action to mitigate its climate change
impact on the marine environment.
It is unlikely that whether the State is a party to one or more Conventions
such as UNCLOS, CBD, UNFCCC, or the Paris Agreement would be
determinative for establishing liability.102 It is likely that a claimant State would
be a developing country that would be highly vulnerable to climate change and
have a heavy economic and social reliance on the marine environment,103 while
the defending Party would most likely be a developed State.104 The higher the
historic and present contribution to climate change by the defending Party,
arguably the better the chance of a successful outcome. The United States, for
example, has not ratified UNCLOS and is, therefore, as a large State which
would otherwise likely be defending against a claimant State, not at risk of being
brought before an UNCLOS tribunal.105 Even if the relevant provisions of
protection of the marine environment are declared as customary international
law, since the United States does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ, the Court would be without authority.106
101.
102.

See UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 192.
The Paris Agreement was adopted on December 12, 2015 at the twenty-first session of the
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Paris from November 30 to December 13, 2015. The
Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, in accordance with Article 21(1).
103. See, e.g., Mariya Gromilova, Rescuing the People of Tuvalu: Towards an I.C.J. Advisory
Opinion on the International Legal Obligations to Protect the Environment and Human Rights of
Populations Affected by Climate Change, 10 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 233‒35 (2015)
(highlighting the particular situation of the island of Tuvalu); Hannah Stallard, Turning Up the Heat on
Tuvalu: An Assessment of Potential Compensation for Climate Change Damage in Accordance with State
Responsibility Under International Law, 15 CANTERBURY L. REV. 163, 167–70 (2009) (discussing the
climate change damage Tuvalu will face).
104. A good example would be Australia. See Doelle, supra note 84, at 325. Another good example
would be China and the United States. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?
The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1675, 1677 (2008).
105. See Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of Arctic Melting: A
Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental Human Rights, 26 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 3, 62 (2007) (noting that the United States has only signed UNCLOS).
106. Andrew L. Strauss, The Legal Option: Suing the United States in International Forums for
Global Warming Emissions, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,185, 10,185‒86 (Jan. 1, 2003). In
1985, the United States withdrew its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court before the second
hearing of the Nicaragua case before the ICJ. Id. There would be little motivation for the United States to
submit itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the ICJ if such submission will only open the possibility of
an adverse judgment against the United States.
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The ability of States to opt out of the binding dispute resolution process
under UNFCCC also poses a challenge. Assuming that all relevant parties have
ratified both UNCLOS and the UNFCCC, for example, one response to a claim
under UNCLOS might be that the parties should agree to settle their disputes
under the dispute settlement process in the UNFCCC.107 This is, however, a
difficult position to defend because there are no binding obligations in the
UNFCCC on individual States to take action to prevent harmful effects on the
marine environment.108 Similarly, the Paris Agreement, which relies on the same
dispute settlement process as the UNFCCC, does not impose obligations on
parties to prevent harm to the marine environment.109 Thus, a claim that pollution
originating from a given State causes harm to the marine environment is unlikely
to be considered a dispute under the UNFCCC or the Paris Agreement. Even
assuming an UNCLOS tribunal, such as ITLOS, ICJ, or an arbitral tribunal,
found that a dispute could be established under the UNFCCC or the Paris
Agreement, under Article 14 of the UNFCCC the parties have a non-mandatory
option to agree on a binding dispute resolution process.110
Moreover, a potential finding that there may be a breach of UNCLOS
obligations through binding dispute settlement over a failure to mitigate the
effects of climate change would raise a number of additional questions. Who can
bring such a claim, and against what countries could such a claim be brought?
What is the likelihood of such a claim? What would be the implications of such
a claim for the climate change regime and international relations more generally?
To what standard would a Party be held?
Finally, there would be problems associated with possible remedies. Would
remedies be limited to a finding that a Party was in violation of its obligations,
or would they extend to an order to reduce pollution, either generally or by a
specific amount? Furthermore, could remedies include an award of damages or
perhaps even an order to assist other parties in adapting to climate change?

107. Boom, supra note 13, at 224 (arguing that “there is clearly a conflict between the procedures
provided in the climate regime and the LOSC. . . . Article 14 of the UNFCCC requires Parties to reach
agreement as to what peaceful means of dispute resolution are to be utilised [sic]. In contrast, the LOSC
provides compulsory binding dispute processes that can be utilised [sic] at the initiation of one Party
only.”).
108. See A. E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 901, 907 (1999) (arguing that the core articles of the UNFCCC are so “cautiously and
obscurely” worded and “so weak” that it is uncertain whether any real obligation is created).
109. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 24; UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art. 14 (“Settlement of
Disputes”).
110. UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art. 14 (“Settlement of Disputes”); Doelle, supra note 84, at 331.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION AT THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF SEA
A. Climate Change Litigation
The idea of filing an action based on climate change damage is not entirely
novel.111 In 2002, Tuvalu, a small island developing State in the South Pacific,
announced that it intended to sue Australia and the United States before the ICJ
over climate change.112 In 2011, the island State of Palau announced plans to
seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the question of States’ legal
responsibility to ensure activities within their territories that emit greenhouse
gases do not harm other States.113
Climate change litigation may take a variety of forms. At the domestic level,
plaintiffs who could prove harm or injury suffered from climate change could
bring actions in local courts against the government, file a claim against
corporations whose conduct has a disproportionate impact on climate change, or
bring a claim before an international tribunal.114 Despite the recognized link
between the actions and failures of industrialized nations to regulate greenhouse
gases and climate change, domestic suits are unlikely to succeed because of
sovereign immunity.115 Furthermore, it could be argued that these emissions do
not necessarily violate international law and that the reference to a right to a
healthy environment in many international instruments does not create a legally
cognizable right to be free from climate change.116
B. Request for Advisory Opinion
The dispute settlement regime in UNCLOS is one of the most complex
systems and one of only a few ever included in any global convention. It is
considered a central pillar of the Convention and part of the delicate
compromises included in the “package-deal” of negotiations that led to the

111. See VERHEYEN, supra note 10, at 225‒332 (analyzing the legal duties that require states to
prevent climate change damage and the extent to which a breach of these duties will give rise to state
liability); see also Peel, supra note 10 (examining challenges for potential litigants across the broad
spectrum of climate change litigation).
112. Jacobs, supra note 10.
113. Xing-Yin Ni, A Nation Going Under: Legal Protection for “Climate Change Refugees”, 38
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 329, 353 (2015).
114. See, e.g., Esmeralda Colombo, Enforcing International Climate Change Law in Domestic
Courts: A New Trend of Cases for Boosting Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration?, 35 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 98, 108–09 (2017) (discussing the value of enforcement of international climate change law in
domestic courts).
115. See JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 92
(2012); Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927 (2007).
116. Posner, supra note 115, at 1930‒31; see also Susan Glazebrook, Human Rights and the
Environment, 40 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 293, 294‒95 (2009).
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adoption of UNCLOS in 1982.117 Under the package deal, States agreed to
accept the Convention in its entirety, with no right to make reservations,118 and
that, as a general principle, all disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of any provision in the Convention would be subject to compulsory
binding dispute settlement.119 When States become parties to UNCLOS, they
consent in advance to the system of compulsory binding dispute settlement in the
Convention.120
The dispute settlement system under UNCLOS is contained in Part XV of
the Convention. The provisions of Part XV are only applicable when there is a
“dispute” that relates to either the “interpretation” or “application” of the
Convention.121 In addition to the dispute requirement, that dispute must also be
“legal” or “justiciable” in that it must be capable of being settled by the
application of principles and rules of international law.122
If a settlement is not reached, UNCLOS stipulates that the dispute can be
submitted, at the request of any party, to the dispute to a court or tribunal having
jurisdiction.123 UNCLOS defines those courts or tribunals with jurisdiction as:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, established in accordance
with Annex VI of the Convention, including the Seabed Disputes Chamber; (b)
the ICJ; (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the
Convention; and (d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.124

117. A.O. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A DRAFTING HISTORY AND A COMMENTARY 241 (1987).
118. States may not make reservations unless expressly permitted by other articles of the
Convention. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 309.
119. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at arts. 286–296.
120. NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 53
(2005) (“No additional form of consent is required once a State is party to the Convention – consent to be
bound by UNCLOS includes consent to compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions (subject to
Sections 1 and 3 of Part XV). Under Section 2, the States in dispute do not need (both or all) to consent
to the referral of the dispute to a court or tribunal, but the dispute can be submitted at the behest of just
one of the disputant States.”).
121. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 286.
122. Id. at art. 293 (stating that the court or tribunal with jurisdiction shall apply the Convention and
“other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention.”). Article 286 of UNCLOS
provides the general rule that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any provision in
the Convention, not settled by the parties, is subject to the system of compulsory binding dispute
settlement in Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS. Id. at art. 286. This is, of course, subject to the limitations
and exceptions to the applicability of Section 2 of Part XV as specified in Section 3 of Part XV. Id. at arts.
297‒99 (Section 3 of Part XV). The parties to a dispute have the obligation to exchange views, under
Article 283, and to exhaust local remedies where this is required by international law, under Article 295.
Id. at arts. 283, 295.
123. Id. at art. 286.
124. Id. at art. 287. The availability of a variety of forums was a compromise to secure consensus
during the negotiations for the compulsory dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. See Jonathan I.
Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 71 (1996).
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Article 191 of UNCLOS provides the advisory jurisdiction of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber, stating that the Chamber “shall give advisory opinions at the
request of the Assembly or the Council on legal questions arising within the
scope of their activities. Such opinions shall be given as a matter of urgency.”125
The Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea also authorize the
Tribunal to give an advisory opinion on a legal question if the submission to the
Tribunal is specifically provided for by “an international agreement related to the
purposes of the Convention.”126 Nonetheless, the non-binding nature of the
ruling of a Tribunal on other States under UNCLOS and its lack of precedential
value on other States who are not parties to the dispute, minimizes the value of
these mechanisms.127
A claimant State may also have the option to seek an advisory opinion at
the ICJ.128 The founding document provides that the ICJ “may give an advisory
opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized
by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request.”129 A State could also request an ICJ advisory opinion through certain
bodies of the United Nations.130 Furthermore, other United Nations organs and
specialized agencies, when authorized by the General Assembly, may also
request advisory opinions of the ICJ on legal questions arising within the scope
of their activities.131
C. Challenges Posed by Climate Change Litigation
At the international level, inter-state disputes and judicial adjudication
involving States suing for climate change damage are not prevalent. There has
been more progress pushing the limits of the law at the national level,132
including a dramatic increase in the number of court cases at the national level
involving climate change-related causes of action in the context of tort law, trade
practices legislation, and action in administrative or constitutional law.133 In
125. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 191; see also International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Rules of the Tribunal arts. 130‒37, ITLOS/8 (Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Rules of the Tribunal].
126. Rules of the Tribunal, supra note 125, at art. 138, ¶ 1. Article 138(3) provides that Articles 130
to 137 shall apply mutatis mutandis. Id. at art. 138, ¶ 3.
127. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 296.
128. Daniel Bodansky, The Role of the International Court of Justice in Addressing Climate Change:
Some Preliminary Reflections, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 689, 711–12 (2017).
129. Statute of the Court of the International Court of Justice art. 65, ¶ 1.
130. Strauss, supra note 106, at 10,187.
131. Jacobs, supra note 10, at 117.
132. See Cameron Jefferies, Filling the Gaps in Canada’s Climate Change Strategy: All Litigation,
All the Time, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1371, 1395–1404 (2015) (documenting recent litigation using
human rights strategies to push Canadian environmental policy); Brian J. Preston, The Influence of
Climate Change Litigation on Governments and the Private Sector, 2 CLIMATE L. 485, 485–86, 509
(2011).
133. Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part 2), 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 244, 244,
256 (2011); see also Nicola Durrant, Tortious Liability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions? Climate Change,
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some countries, such as Australia and the United States, climate change cases
have been filed in state courts and administrative tribunals, relying on existing
legislation to compel government decision makers to consider the risks
associated with climate change in their planning processes.134
There is a convincing case that failure to mitigate climate change falls under
the definition of pollution of the marine environment under UNCLOS, which can
be considered a violation of the obligations of States parties under UNCLOS to
protect and preserve the marine environment. However, no such claim or case
has been submitted for adjudication in any international forum.135 There are a
number of critical hurdles that need to be surmounted first. These hurdles include
the question of establishing standing to sue, the attribution of acts of private
corporations and individuals to a State, the questions of legal and factual
causation for climate change damage, the question of allocation of responsibility
for multiple wrongdoers, the possibility of raising valid defenses which may
preclude liability, and the suite of available remedies to redress and compensate
the damages sustained by a claimant State for climate change damages.136
The dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of UNCLOS
clearly creates an obligation among States to settle their claims peacefully by any
means of their own choice.137 However, the principle of peaceful settlement of
international disputes operates on the basis of the sovereign equality of States.138
The compulsory settlement mechanism within the framework of UNCLOS is
triggered only as an option where the parties are not able to settle their
differences by peaceful means of their choice.139 But, even then, the submission
of a dispute to such a forum depends on the willingness of the parties.140 As such,

Causation and Public Policy Considerations, 7 QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 403, 405 (2007)
(assessing the legal principles associated with potential negligence claims against industrial emitters in
Australia for harms from climate change).
134. Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways: A
Comparative Analysis of the United States and Australia, 35 LAW & POL’Y 150, 156 (2013).
135. See Doelle, supra note 84, at 324 (“The substance of Part XII [of UNCLOS] has not been
interpreted by any international tribunal.”).
136. Boom, supra note 13, at 229.
137. UNCLOS, supra note 11 at art. 280; A.O. Adede, Prolegomena to the Disputes Settlement Part
of the Law of the Sea Convention, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 253, 257 (1977); Lowell Bautista, Dispute
Settlement in the Law of the Sea Convention and Territorial and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia:
Issues, Opportunities, and Challenges, 6 ASIAN POL. & POL’Y 375, 378‒82 (2014); Howard S. Schiffman,
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of UNCLOS: A Potentially Important Framework for Marine Wildlife
Management, 1 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 293, 296‒97 (1998); Louis B. Sohn, Settlement of Disputes
Arising Out of the Law of the Sea Convention, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 497‒500 (1975).
138. See Ted L. McDorman, Global Ocean Governance and International Adjudicative Dispute
Resolution, 43 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 255, 258–59 (2000) (asserting that the dispute settlement
procedure of UNCLOS is not part of customary law and, thus, are only binding upon those states which
are parties to UNCLOS).
139. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 286.
140. In this regard, the dispute resolution mechanism may appear to offer no progress over previous
regimes. This is actually not the case. In international law there is really no judicial forum with compulsory
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the settlement process is only as good as the claimant States are willing to
formally invoke it.
CONCLUSION
There is a growing recognition of the importance of ocean environmental
protection in international jurisprudence.141 One of the most significant recent
examples is the South China Sea arbitration decision.142 Despite this, however,
State practice still shows serious gaps in adopting this trend. In particular, current
research on State practice of national and regional marine pollution contingency
planning in Asia-Pacific reveals that there has been little regard displayed in the
region for accommodating a proactive approach to marine environmental
protection.
The international community is attempting to tackle the problem of climate
change and to find ways to mitigate the damages associated with it, and this is
particularly true in States suffering the consequences of climate change and sealevel rise.143 One suggestion has been to bring a legal claim before an
international tribunal to commence climate change litigation. From the
perspective of the current regime of international law, including the Law of the
Sea and State responsibility, the feasibility and effectiveness of such climate
change litigation is highly questionable. This is largely based on the problem of
establishing causation and other related issues. An alternative suggestion is to
use the legal mechanism of UNCLOS, not to have an adjudication of the issue,
but to seek the issuance of an advisory opinion on the legal question presented
by climate change in light of international agreements related to the purposes of
UNCLOS. The problem with such an advisory opinion, however, would be its
effectiveness due to its non-binding character.

jurisdiction. Any form of third-party dispute resolution is founded upon the assent of the parties involved.
The lack of compulsion to submit to judicial forums under UNCLOS is neither a serious drawback nor
does it fall short of legitimate expectations. The UNCLOS dispute settlement regime improves upon the
Optional Protocol system in the sense that, in the case of the former, States become automatically bound
by the compulsory procedures upon ratification of the UNCLOS, whereas under the latter, States become
bound only when they become parties to the Protocol.
141. See, e.g., Yoshifumi Tanaka, Provisional Measures Prescribed by ITLOS and Marine
Environmental Protection, 108 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 365 (2014) (discussing the
use of provisional measures by ITLOS in marine environmental protection); David L. VanderZwaag, The
ICJ, ITLOS and the Precautionary Approach: Paltry Progressions, Jurisprudential Jousting, 35 U. HAW.
L. REV. 617, 623‒25 (2013) (discussing the importance of marine pollution cases in developing the
precautionary principle). At the ITLOS, cases which had aspects of marine environmental protection
include: The MOX Plant Case, supra note 57; Straits of Johor Case, supra note 57; Southern Bluefin Tuna
Cases, supra note 40.
142. The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶¶ 906‒11, 925‒38.
143. See, e.g., Lowell Bautista, Legal and Policy Responses to Climate Change in the Philippines,
in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
647, 648–63 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015) (examining the impacts of climate change in the Philippines and
how to effectively implement national policies to mitigate these impacts).
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An effective and equitable response to climate change involves a
commitment from the international community to put in place adequate and
sustainable funding arrangements towards climate change mitigation and
adaptation, technology transfer, and capacity building.144 The global goal of
climate change adaptation should be to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen
resilience, and reduce vulnerability of States to climate change.145
In conclusion, there is no single solution to resolve the issue of climate
change, but a better understanding of the linkages between Parties’ obligations
under relevant treaties such as the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and
UNCLOS, among others, may provide further impetus for States to take climate
change seriously and increase their efforts to negotiate additional agreements and
implement them effectively.

144. Burleson, supra note 1, at 549‒50. For instance, the Copenhagen Accord provides that the
Green Climate Fund will facilitate developed countries in providing “adequate, predictable and sustainable
financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation action
in developing countries.” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, at
6, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010).
145. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. 7, 11.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to articles
may be viewed at our website, hrrp://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.
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